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Käesolev kursus on jätkukursus sissejuhatavale kursusele Euroopa Liidu institutsiooni-
dest. Kursuse eesmärgiks on avada oma olemuses Euroopa Liidu pädevusi ja poliitika-
valdkondade jaotumist lähtuvalt Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu tööst. 
 
Euroopa Liit saab endale kompetentsuse tulenevalt aluslepingutest ning teostab poliiti-
kaid institutsioonide ja liikmesriikide koostöös vastavalt aluslepingutes kokkulepitud 
menetlusviisidele. 
 
Pädevuste nimekirja (ehk kompetentside kataloogi) loomist on pidanud vajalikuks Sak-
samaa (jutuks olnud eesistumisperioodil kevadel 2007), käesoleval hetkel on kompe-
tentside tegelikke piire võimalik hinnata aluslepingute ning Euroopa Parlamendi ning 
Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu kodukordi analüüsides. 
 
 
EUROOPA LIIDU PÄDEVUSTE ALLIKAS 
 
Euroopa Liit saab oma pädevused liikmesriikidelt ning need on sätestatud aluslepingutes. 
Kõik valdkonnad, milles liikmesriigid on reguleerimise pädevuse Ühendusele üle 
andnud, on aluslepingute artiklites määratletud üsna detailselt. Euroopa Liidu Nõukogul 
on õigus lepingute sisu ka vajadusel tõlgendada ning võtta ühehäälsuse alusel vastu 
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regulatsioone tulenevalt aluslepingute artiklite sätete mõttest olukordades, kus Euroopa 
Komisjon on teinud vastava ettepaneku ning Euroopa Parlament sellega nõustunud. 
Menetlusviisid on sätestatud samuti aluslepingutes ning määratletud valdkondade lõikes 
eraldi. 
 
 
EL (EÜ) PÄDEVUSED (COMPETENCES OD THE EU) 
 
Euroopa Liidu pädevused jaotuvad:  
• Euroopa Liidu ainupädevusteks,  
• Euroopa Liidu ja liikmesriikide jagatud ehk konkureerivateks pädevusteks või  
• Euroopa Liidu toetava, koordineeriva või/ja vastastikku täiendavate meetmete 
valdkonnaks (ingl.k open method of coordination, OMC) 
 
Euroopa Liidu ainupädevuste (ingl k. exclusive powers of the EU) allikaks on alus-
lepingud ning sellesse valdkonda kuuluvad teemad, nt: tolliliit, siseturg, eurotsooni raha-
poliitika, väliskaubanduspoliitika. 
 
Euroopa Liidu ja liikmesriikide jagatud pädevuste (ingl. k areas of shared powers) vald-
konnas loodud regulatsioonid on liikmesriikidele kohustuslikud, samas on valdkondade 
arv loetletud. Sellesse valdkonda kuuluvad näiteks transport, energeetika, Schengen, 
teadusuuringud, tehnoloogia arendamine, tarbijakaitse, arengukoostöö. 
 
Euroopa Liidu toetava, koordineeriva ja vastastikku täiendavate meetmete valdkonda 
(ingl k areas of complementary competence) kuuluvad poliitikavaldkonnad, mis on 
aluslepingute kohaselt liikmesriikide pädevuses, kuid milles on loodud võimalus parimate 
praktikate vahetamiseks või avatud koordinatsiooniks. Valdkonda kuuluvad näiteks 
turism, tööstus, sotsiaalpoliitika, haridus, noorsootöö. 
 
 
COMPETENCES OF THE UNION 
 
A distinction is made in defining the Union's exclusive powers, the powers shared between the 
Union and Member States, and the Union's powers that are complementary or coordinate to 
those of Member States. 
  
Exclusive powers of the EU 
In policy areas that are within the scope of the Union's exclusive competence, Member States 
may not implement any measures that might jeopardise the efficient attainment of Union‐level 
objectives in those areas. These include common trade policy, protection of fish resources and 
monetary policy.  
  
Areas of shared powers 
In areas of shared powers, the EU's competence does not take complete precedence over the 
competence of Member States in the same areas. However, in areas of shared competence, any 
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provision laid down by the Union may limit the actions of Member States and they cannot 
implement measures that are not in accordance with the Union's provisions. All areas that do not 
belong to the category of the Union's exclusive powers can in principle be categorised as areas of 
shared competence. 
  
Areas of complementary competence 
In areas of complementary competence, such as development cooperation, action by the Union 
is limited to supporting, encouraging, and coordinating action taken by Member States. 
Therefore, Union‐level action cannot completely supersede the competence of the Member 
States. In certain areas of complementary competence, Treaty provisions prohibit the 
harmonisation of the national laws of Member States. Such areas include academic education, 
vocational education, youth and culture. In certain other areas, such as economic and 
employment policy, Union institutions may introduce measures to coordinate the action of 
Member States. 
Allikas: EU Presidency, Slovenia, 
http://www.eu2008.si/en/About_the_EU/Competence_of_the_EU/index.html 
 
 
 
EUROOPA LIIDU PÄDEVUSTE RAKENDUMINE 
 
Euroopa Liidu pädevusi rakendavad ning valdkondade poliitikaid kujundavad Euroopa 
Liidu institutsioonid – Euroopa Komisjon, Euroopa Parlament ning Euroopa Liidu 
Nõukogu. Kohtu roll ilmneb peamiselt rikkumismenetlustes, Keskpank osaleb rahaliidu 
küsimuste reguleerimises, kindel hulk poliitikaid peavad olema kooskõlastatud ka 
Regioonide Komitee või Majandus- ja Sotsiaalkomiteega. 
 
Õppematerjalide hulgas leiduv CEPS raport “The Ever-Changing Union An Introduct-
ion to the History, Institutions and Decision-Making Processes of the European 
Union“ avab peatükkides 3 ja 4 nii menetlusviisid kui ka institutsioonide rollid. 
Euroopa Ühenduse ja Euroopa Liidu aluslepingud avavad menetlusviiside ning 
poliitikavaldkondade reguleerimise tausta. 
 
Juhan Lepassaare slaidid võtavad kokku menetlusviisid ning nõukogu koosseisud, 
samuti selgitavad, millised Euroopa Komisjoni peadirektoraadid ning millised Eesti 
ministeeriumid antud küsimustega seotud on. 
 
Eraldi on allpool välja toodud Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu kui antud kursuse kontekstis  
keskse organi koosseisud ning töökorralduse peamised aspektid, mis toetavad esimeste 
õppetükkide omandamist. 
 
 
 
EUROOPA LIIDU NÕUKOGU KOOSSEISUD 
(allikas: Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu kodukord) 
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1. Üldasjad ja välissuhted1 
2. Majandus- ja rahanduspoliitika2 
3. Justiits- ja siseküsimused3 
4. Tööhõive, sotsiaalpoliitika, tervishoid ja tarbijakaitseküsimused 
5. Konkurentsivõime (siseturg, tööstus ja teadusuuringud)4 
6. Transport, telekommunikatsioon ja energeetika 
7. Põllumajandus ja kalandus 
8. Keskkond 
9. Haridus, noorsootöö ja kultuur5 
 
Igal liikmesriigil on EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 203 kohaselt õigus otsustada, mil viisil ta on 
nõukogus esindatud. 
 
Mitu ministrit võib osaleda täisliikmena sama koosseisuga nõukogu istungil, mille päeva-
korda ja töökorraldust on vastavalt muudetud.6 
 
Üldasjade ja välissuhete nõukogu puhul esindab iga valitsust selle koosseisu eri istungitel 
asjaomase valitsuse valitud minister või riigisekretär. 
 
1 Kaasa arvatud Euroopa julgeoleku- ja kaitsepoliitika ning arengukoostöö. 
2 Kaasa arvatud eelarve. 
3 Kaasa arvatud kodanikukaitse. 
4 Kaasa arvatud turism. 
5 Kaasa arvatud audiovisuaalsektor. 
6Vt järgmist märkust 1: 
1) I lisa teise lõigu kohta 
“Istungite päevakordi koostades rühmitab eesistujariik omavahel seotud päevakorrapunk-
tid, et hõlbustada asjaomaste riikide esindajate osalemist, eelkõige siis, kui teatav nõukogu 
koosseis peab tegelema selgesti eristatavate teemakooslustega.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NÕUKOGU TÖÖ KORRALDAMINE 
(allikas: Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu kodukord) 
 
OREPER, KOMITEED JA TÖÖRÜHMAD 
 
Artikli 19 lõige 10 
COREPER, komiteed ja töörühmad 
 
1. COREPER vastutab nõukogu töö ettevalmistamise ja talle nõukogu poolt pandud ülesannete 
täitmise eest. Ta tagab igal juhul Euroopa Liidu poliitika ja toimingute kooskõla ning kannab 
hoolt, et peetakse kinni järgmistest põhimõtetest ja eeskirjadest: 
a) õiguspärasuse, subsidiaarsuse ja proportsionaalsuse põhimõte ning õigusaktide põhjendamise 
põhimõte; 
b) liidu institutsioonide ja asutuste volituste kehtestamist käsitlevad eeskirjad; 
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c) eelarvesätted; 
d) kodukorda, läbipaistvust ja õigusaktide väljatöötamise kvaliteeti käsitlevad eeskirjad. 
 
2. Kui COREPER ei otsusta teisiti, vaatab ta eelnevalt läbi kõik nõukogu istungi päevakorrapunk-
tid. COREPER püüab oma tasandil jõuda kokkuleppele, mis esitatakse nõukogule vastuvõt-
miseks. Ta tagab, et nõukogule esitatakse asjakohased dokumendid ning esitab vajaduse korral 
nõukogule suuniseid, valikuvõimalusi või soovituslikke lahendusi. Eriolukorra puhul võib 
nõukogu ühehäälselt otsustada lahendada küsimus ilma sellise eelneva läbivaatuseta. 
 
3. Eelnevalt kindlaksmääratud ettevalmistustöö või uuringute korraldamiseks võib COREPER 
moodustada komiteesid või töörühmi või anda nõusoleku nende moodustamiseks. 
Peasekretariaat ajakohastab ja avaldab ettevalmistusorganite nimekirja. Nõukogu ettevalmistus-
organitena võivad kokku tulla üksnes selles nimekirjas loetletud komiteed ja töörühmad. 
 
4. COREPERi tööd juhib sõltuvalt päevakorrapunktist nõukogu eesistujariigina tegutseva 
liikmesriigi alaline esindaja või tema asetäitja. Kõnealuse liikmesriigi volitatud esindaja tegutseb 
ka asutamislepingutes ettenähtud eri komiteede eesistujana, kui nõukogu ei otsusta teisiti. Sama 
kehtib lõikes 3 nimetatud komiteede ja töörühmade kohta, kui COREPER ei otsusta teisiti. 
 
5. Niisuguste nõukogu koosseisude istungite ettevalmistamiseks, mis tulevad kokku kord pool-
aastas ja kui istung toimub selle perioodi esimesel poolel, juhatab eelmisel poolaastal peetavate 
muude komiteede kui COREPERi ja töörühmade istungeid selle liikmesriigi volitatud esindaja, 
kelle ülesandeks on tegutseda vastavate nõukogu istungite eesistujana. 
 
6. Kui poolaasta vältel arutatakse küsimusi sisuliselt, võib sel poolaastal eesistujana tegutseva 
liikmesriigi esindaja juhatada muude komiteede kui COREPERi ning töörühmade tööd järgneval 
poolaastal, kui arutatakse kõnealuseid küsimusi. Kaks asjaomast eesistujariiki lepivad omavahel 
kokku selle lõike tegelikus rakendamises. 
Kui tegemist on erijuhtumiga, kus vaadatakse läbi teatava eelarveaasta ühenduse eelarvet, siis 
muude nõukogu ettevalmistusorganite kui COREPERi istungeid, kus valmistatakse ette eelarve 
läbivaatamist käsitlevaid nõukogu päevakorrapunkte, juhatab selle liikmesriigi esindaja, kes 
tegutseb nõukogu eesistujana selle aasta teisel poolaastal, mis eelneb kõnealusele eelarveaastale. 
Kokkuleppel teise eesistujariigiga kohaldatakse sama korda kõnealuste eelarveküsimustega 
tegelevate nõukogu istungite juhatamise suhtes. Asjaomased eesistujariigid konsulteerivad 
omavahel praktilise korralduse üle. 
 
7. Edaspidi esitatavate sätete kohaselt võib COREPER vastu võtta järgmisi otsuseid menetlus-
küsimustes, tingimusel et nendega seotud küsimused on võetud päevakorraprojekti vähemalt 
kolm tööpäeva enne istungit; sellest tähtajast kõrvalekaldumine nõuab COREPERi ühehäälset 
otsust:12 
a) otsus pidada nõukogu istung muus kohas peale Brüsseli või Luxembourgi (artikli 1 lõige 3); 
b) luba esitada kohtumenetluses koopia või väljavõte nõukogu dokumendist (artikli 6 lõige 2); 
c) otsus korraldada nõukogus avalik mõttevahetus (artikli 8 lõige 3); 
d) otsus avalikustada hääletustulemused artikli 9 lõigetes 2 ja 3 sätestatud juhtudel; 
e) otsus kasutada kirjalikku menetlust (artikli 12 lõige 1); 
f) nõukogu protokolli kinnitamine või muutmine (artikli 13 lõiked 2 ja 3); 
g) otsus avaldada või mitte avaldada tekst või õigusakt Euroopa Liidu Teatajas (artikli 17 lõiked 
2, 3 ja 4); 
h) otsus konsulteerida mõne institutsiooni või organiga; 
i) otsus kehtestada institutsiooni või organiga konsulteerimise kohta tähtaeg või seda pikendada; 
j) otsus pikendada EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 251 lõikes 7 osutatud tähtaegu; 
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k) institutsioonile või organile saadetava kirja sõnastuse heakskiitmine. 
 
Artikkel 20 
Eesistujariik ja arutelude korraldamine 
 
1. Eesistujariik vastutab käesoleva kodukorra kohaldamise ning arutelude asjakohase 
korraldamise eest. Eelkõige tagab eesistujariik, et laienenud nõukogu töökorraldust käsitleva IV 
lisa sätted on täidetud. 
Arutelude nõuetekohase läbiviimise tagamiseks võib nõukogu, kui ta ei otsusta teisiti, võtta mis 
tahes meetmeid, mida on vaja istungi aja parimaks võimalikuks kasutamiseks, eelkõige selleks, 
et: 
a) piirata teatava küsimuse arutamisel istungiruumis viibivate delegatsiooni liikmete arvu ning 
otsustada, kas anda luba arutelude jälgimise ruumi avamiseks; 
b) kehtestada päevakorrapunktide käsitlemise järjekord ja otsustada nendega seotud arutelude 
kestus; 
c) korraldada konkreetsete päevakorrapunktide käsitlemise ajaline jaotus, eelkõige piirates 
osalejate sõnavõtuaega ja määrates nende sõnavõttude järjekorra; 
d) paluda delegatsioonidelt, et nad esitaksid oma kirjalikud ettepanekud arutatava teksti muutmi-
seks teatavaks kuupäevaks, vajaduse korral koos lühiselgitusega; 
e) paluda delegatsioonidel, kes on teatava päevakorrapunkti, teksti või tekstiosa suhtes samal või 
lähedasel seisukohal, valida enda hulgast üks, kes esitaks selle ühise seisukoha istungil või 
kirjalikult enne istungit. 
 
2. Eesistujariiki abistab järgmise eesistujana tegutseva liikmesriigi esindaja, ilma et see piiraks 
artikli 19 lõigete 4–6 sätete kohaldamist, eesistujariigi volitusi ja üldist poliitilist vastutust. 
Eesistujariigi taotlusel ja tema juhendite järgi tegutsedes asendab järgmise eesistujana tegutseva 
liikmesriigi esindaja vajaduse korral eesistujat, võtab üle teatavad kohustused ja tagab nõukogu 
töö järjepidevuse. 
 
 
Artikkel 2113,14 
Komiteede ja töörühmade aruanded 
 
Käesoleva kodukorra muudest sätetest olenemata korraldab eesistujariik eri komiteede ja töörüh-
made istungid nii, et nende aruanded on kättesaadavad enne seda COREPERi istungit, kus neid 
käsitletakse. 
Kui asja kiireloomulisus ei nõua teisti, lükkab eesistujariik mõnele järgmisele COREPERi istun-
gile edasi kõik artiklis 7 käsitletud seadusandlusega seotud päevakorrapunktid, mille arutamist ei 
ole komitee või töörühm lõpetanud vähemalt viis tööpäeva enne COREPERi istungit. 
 
Artikkel 22 
Õigusaktide väljatöötamise kvaliteet15 
 
Selleks et abistada nõukogu nende õigusaktide väljatöötamise kvaliteedi tagamisel, mida ta vastu 
võtab, on õigusteenistuse ülesanne õigel ajal kontrollida ettepanekute ja eelnõude väljatöötamise 
kvaliteeti ning teha nõukogule ja tema organitele õigusaktide väljatöötamist käsitlevaid soovitusi 
22. detsembri 1998. aasta institutsioonidevahelise kokkuleppe kohaselt. 
Need, kes esitavad nõukogu tööga seotud tekste, peavad kogu õigusaktide menetlemise aja jook-
sul pöörama erilist tähelepanu õigusaktide väljatöötamise kvaliteedile. 
 
Artikkel 23 
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Peasekretär ja peasekretariaat 
 
1. Nõukogule on abiks peasekretariaat, mida juhatab peasekretär, keda abistab asepeasekretär, kes 
vastutab peasekretariaadi töö eest. Peasekretäri ja asepeasekretäri määrab nõukogu ametisse 
kvalifitseeritud häälteenamusega. 
 
2. Nõukogu otsustab peasekretariaadi struktuuri.16 
Peasekretär ja asepeasekretär võtavad nõukogu alluvuses kõik vajalikud meetmed, et kindlustada 
peasekretariaadi tõrgeteta töö. 
 
3. Peasekretariaat on tihedalt ja pidevalt seotud nõukogu töö korraldamise, kooskõlastamise ja 
selle ühtsuse tagamisega ning aastaprogrammi rakendamisega. Peasekretariaat abistab eesistu-
jariiki lahenduste leidmisel viimase vastutusel ja suuniste kohaselt. 
Euroopa Liidu lepingu sätete kohaselt abistab peasekretär nõukogu ja eesistujariiki ühist välis- ja 
julgeolekupoliitikat käsitlevates küsimustes, kaasa arvatud eriesindajate töö kooskõlastamine. 
Vajaduse korral võib peasekretär paluda, et eesistujariik kutsuks kokku komitee või töörühma 
eelkõige ühist välis- ja julgeolekupoliitikat käsitlevates küsimustes, või võtaks teatava punkti 
komitee või töörühma istungi päevakorda. 
4. Peasekretär või asepeasekretär esitab nõukogu kulude eelarvestuse projekti nõukogule piisavalt 
aegsasti, et tagada finantssätetega ettenähtud tähtaegadest kinnipidamine. 
5. Peasekretäril, keda abistab asepeasekretär, on täielik vastutus eelarve II osasse “Nõukogu” kir-
jendatud assigneeringute haldamise eest ning ta võtab kõik meetmed nimetatud assigneeringute 
nõuetekohase haldamise tagamiseks. Ta rakendab kõnealuseid assigneeringuid Euroopa 
ühenduste üldeelarve suhtes kohaldatava finantsmääruse asjakohaste sätete kohaselt. 
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In search for compromise between pragmatic 
considerations and democratic ideals: the EU comitology 
system 
 
By Marika Linntam1 
 
December 2008 
 
Introduction 
 
This study provides a simple overview of the EU’s comitology process, by which the 
EU passes a large number of measures through committee‐based procedures. 
 
What is comitology? Most EU legislation is not enacted as secondary legislation by 
the Council and the European Parliament, but as delegated secondary legislation by 
comitology committees. Comitology refers to the often mystified process of 
committees of national officials working with the European Commission during the 
implementation of EU legislation at the European level. In other words, it is a system 
of Member States’ control over the Commission when it is implementing policies, i.e. 
managing specific policies or programs. 
While adopted legislative acts number hundreds every year (150 in 2006), 
comitology acts number well into the thousands annually; 2862 in 2006 and 2522 in 
2007. Comitology committees consist of representatives of the Commission 
(chairman) and governments of each Member States. Their purpose is to validate 
proposals made by the Commission following different comitology procedures. 
Today, there are about 264 such comitology committees. They take a host of 
technical regulatory decisions that are too detailed and complex to merit the 
attention of a full legislative procedure and eventually take a lot less time than a co‐
decision procedure. 
 Since the 2006 major reform, there are five comitology procedures in place, 
including a new actor to the comitology structure: the European Parliament. While 
the so‐called general alignment was concluded in early 2009, a ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty would further affect the European institutional balance between the 
different stakeholders of comitology (Bergström, 2005; Egeberg et al., 2003; 
Rhinard, 2002; Shapiro, 2006; Vos, 1999). 
 
The report is structured as follows: First, we briefly glance at the evolution of 
comitology at the European level. We identify four distinctive historical periods. 
Then, we explain the five procedures currently in place and provide some practical 
                                                        
1 I would like to thank Dr Michael Kaeding (European Institute of Public Administration) for valuable 
input on large parts of this contribution. Furthermore, the usual disclaimer applies: all views expressed in 
this article are entirely personal. 
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data on comitology. Last but not least, we describe the background of the 2006 
reform and its consequences for the comitology process to, then, conclude with 
some final remarks on the future of comitology after Lisbon.  
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1. The Evolution of the Comitology System – a historical overview: 
In the 1950s no explicit provision was made for the creation of comitology 
committees. The Rome Treaty forsaw the delegation of powers to the Commission, 
but there was no specification of how such delegated powers would be used or 
controlled. This lack of clarity in the original treaty is part of the reason that 
comitology has become subject of institutional disputes in later years. Overall, three 
phases of distinctive historical periods can be identified: the first, from 1962 until 
1986, which marks the beginning of the creation of comitology committees up to the 
first attempt of systematizing through a Council Decision that followed the Single 
European Act (SEA). The second phase, from 1987 until 1998, saw the 
implementation of the first Comitology Decision leading to the major 1999 reform. A 
third period lasted from the adoption of the 1999 Decision until the 2006 reform.  
 
1.1. From 1962 to 1986 - the beginning of comitology committees 
The first committees set up in the early 1960s by the Council had a simple advisory 
function. For measures related to agriculture Member States established different 
procedures in order to control the Commission’s adoption of individual 
implementing acts. In 1962, Council Regulation No 19 on the progressive 
establishment of a common organisation of the market in cereals created a common 
market for cereals. Article 25 of this measure foresaw the creation of a management 
committee, composed of representatives of Member States and chaired by the 
Commission.  
 
This management procedure then soon became standard procedure for many other 
committees and was ‘exported’ to fields other than agriculture. In addition the so‐
called  ‘regulatory procedure’, was created. In 1968, the Council adopted the 
Directive regarding the harmonization of legislation on custom duties for third party 
goods transiting in the EC territory. Its article 26 established a committee where, for 
the first time, the Member State representatives were to express their opinion on 
the draft measures submitted by the Commission through a formal vote.  
 
In the following years the practice of creating committees to assist the Commission 
gained increasing importance . The use of these procedures rapidly expanded to 
further sectors besides the agriculture and customs duties. Once established, The 
number of committees have been growing without an explicit treaty framework. 
Criticism has been mainly pronounced by the European Parliament (EP). At the time 
of the creation of comitology, before direct elections (1979) and the introduction of 
legislative powers that came with the Single European Act (1985) and the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), there had been no case for involving the EP in this 
process. However, with the rise of the EP in the institutional framework, the EP’s 
involvement in comitology – or rather the lack of its involvement ‐ soon became a 
pressing issue (Bradley, 1997). 
 
1.2. From 1987 to 1998 - the implementation of the first Comitology Decision  
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The SEA provided an opportunity to change the relevant articles in the treaty. 
Completed on 17 December 1985, the new treaty contained a number of important 
provisions concerning the delegation of powers. On the institutional side, the SEA 
provided for an extension of executive powers to the European Commission and a 
reinforcement of the role of the EP. For comitology, this meant the insertion of a 
third indent in Art. 145 of the EC Treaty (now Article 202): 
 
“The Council shall confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council 
adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays 
down. The Council may impose certain requirements in respect of the exercise 
of these powers. These procedures must be consonant with principles and rules 
to be laid down in advance by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after obtaining the Opinion of the European 
Parliament.” 
 
The new Article 145 happens to be the only treaty amendment concerning 
comitology to date. It creats an obligation for the Council to delegate the power of 
adopting implementing measures to the Commission and it gives formal recognition 
of comitology commitees.  
 
This was soon followed in 1987 with the adoption of a Council Decision establishing 
the principles and rules required to regulate the delegation of powers. Based on the 
declaration annexed to the SEA, the IGC asked the Council “to adopt before the act 
enters into force, the principles and rules on the basis of which the Commission’s 
powers of implementation will be defined to ach case”. Adopted in July 1987 the  
Council Decision was the first example of systematization in the comitology system 
and an attempt to improve its efficiency. Overall, it introduced four standard 
procedures. The first three were the formalisation of the formulas used until then 
(advisory I; management IIa, IIb; and regulatory IIIa, IIIb) while the forth was 
applicable to safeguard clauses (IVa, IVb).  
 
In the final text of the 1987 Council Decision kept much of the control over the 
Commission in the implementation phase. On 2 October 1987, the EP brought an 
action for annulment against the Council Decision. Claiming that the decision was 
incompatible with the spirit of the treaties and jeopardised the EP’s right of control, 
since the Council itself could directly exercise its implementing powers. Stipulated 
in 1988, the so‐called Plumb Delors Agreement, the European Commission agreed to 
forward draft implementing measures to the EP, as a follow‐up to a promise already 
made during the debate for the adoption of the 1987 Decision. In fact, the main issue 
at stake was not the EP’s will to control the Commission in the implementing phase 
but a more generic right to be informed of the existence of the proposed 
implementing measures, and to enjoy rights equal to those of the Council in the 
decision‐making process. This explains in part the cooperative attitude of the 
Commission towards the EP’s demands. In the years following the Plumb Delors 
Agreement several inter‐institutional agreements were stipulated in order to 
temporarily solve the main sources of tension.  
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In 1993, the Klepsch-Millan Agreement increased the number documents that could 
be transmitted to the EP, particularly with regards to structural funds, Community 
support frameworks and operational programmes.  
 
Another inter‐institutional agreement (Modus vivendi) in 1994 provided the 
possibility to forward the draft implementing measure in areas governed by 
codecision to the EP. This agreement was further supplemented by an accord 
between the Commission and the EP in 1996, the so‐called Samland-Williamson 
Agreement. This reinforced the right of the EP to be informed of the work of the 
committee and granted MEPs the right to attend management or regulatory 
committee meetings, provided that the Members of the committee unanimously 
approved their presence.  
 
1.3. From 1999 to 2006 - from the adoption of the 1999 Decision until 2006 
Against the background of a disappointing Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the 
Commission proposed a new Comitology system, which was adopted in 1999, 
including  a number of important reforms. For a start, the total number of 
procedures was reduced from 7 to 4. Furthermore, the Commission committed itself 
to avoid going against a ‘dominant position’ within the committee, beyond being 
bound by the formal vote of Member States (aérosol clause). In 2006 the Council 
approved yet a new Comitology Decision, which introduced further powers to the 
EP. Responding to the failure of ratification of the Constituional Treaty, the EP 
managed to exert great pressure on the Member States. Threatening to block 
Lamfalussy acts and the 2006 budget for expenditure on comitology committees, 
Member States, eventually, accepted a limited reform related only to the “quasi‐
legislative” acts adopted under the co‐decision procedure (Christiansen and Vaccari, 
2006). The 2006 reform introduced a new criterion to define implementing 
measures, the so‐called regulatory procedure with scrutiny and herewith further 
strengthened the role of the EP. 
 
With regard to transparency, a newly introduced Art. 7 establishes two main 
actions: the EP is granted the right to be informed on the workings of the comitology 
committees on a regular basis, and consequently, more rights of information and 
access to documents are granted to the public. Therefore, the Commission commits 
itself to publishing a list of all committees assisting the Commission in its 
implementing powers within 6 months of the Decision’s entry into force. In addition 
to this list, it is foreseen that a register and repository of documents transmitted to 
the EP is set up within the framework of its right to information. This implies the 
Commission’s regular transmission of documents related to comitology committee 
meetings, such as agendas, voting results, list of participants, summary reports, and 
draft implementing measures when the basic act was adopted in codecision.  
 
In addition, Article 8 of the Comitology Decision grants a right of scrutiny to the EP, 
which implies the possibility for the EP to adopt a resolution when it deems that the 
Commission exceeds its implementing powers when proposing a draft 
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implementing measure to the Committee, as soon as the correspondent legislative 
act has been adopted in codecision. Therefore, whilst the EP is granted the right to 
check the content of the measure, it is nevertheless obliged to limit its control to the 
legitimacy of the Commission in proposing an implementing measure, as opposed to 
exercising a political control on the measure itself. 
 
Furthermore, the 1999 Decision introduced a number of criteria to guide the 
legislator with regard to choice of the appropriate comitology procedure. The 
management procedure is now formally associated with implementing measures in 
the field of agriculture or for the implementation of programmes with notable 
budgetary significance. The regulatory procedure is to be used in case of measures 
of a more general scope with a “legislative impact”, particularly in cases of health 
and safety of persons, and when the basic act implies a possibility to adapt/update 
non‐essential elements by an implementing measure. Finally, the advisory 
procedure is identified as the default procedure if the other criteria are not met (per 
default).  
 
To conclude, it is evident that, since the establishment of the first comitology 
committees in the 1960s, the institutional system has evolved considerably. The 
tensions between the institutions concerning comitology reveal the search for a 
power‐equilibrium, satisfying the different expectations and needs of three different 
institutions. Especially the EP has gained substantial rights of information, scrutiny 
and veto. With the 2006 reform the co‐legislator stands for most cases on equal 
footing with the Council when dealing with comitology files (Christiansen and 
Vaccari, 2006). All in all, it was the inter‐institutional tensions which have triggered 
considerable progress towards more transparency and democracy even if this is 
often seen to come at the expense of a more coherent and efficient system.  
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2. Five Different Comitology Procedures: 
The 2006 amendment of Council Decision 1999/468 defines the criteria for the 
choice of committee procedures. There are five different comitology procedures 
currently in place: advisory, management, regulatory, regulatory with scrutiny and 
safeguard procedure. 
 
2.1. Advisory procedure (Art. 3): 
This method is used when the policy being regulated is not very politically sensitive. 
It is the last binding on the Commission and the quickest. Following draft measures 
by the Commission, the committee delivers its opinion within a certain time limit “if 
necessary by taking a vote” (simple majority). Each Member State has one vote. The 
Commission then must take the “utmost account of the opinion delivered” and 
inform the committee of the manner in which its opinion has been taken into 
account. Legally, the Commission is not obliged to follow the committee’s opinion. 
 
2.2. Management procedure (Art. 4): 
This procedure is used for measures relating to the management of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, fisheries and the main EU funded programs. The management 
procedure is more binding on the Commission. In simple terms, the Commission 
must avoid a negative opinion of the committee (91 votes). First, the Commission 
transmits a draft implementing measure to a committee composed of government 
representatives for consideration. In case of agreement or no opinion, the measure 
will be adopted. In the case of disagreement– the committee votes by QMV (255 out 
of 345 votes) ‐  then the matter is referred to the Council.  The Council then can 
either confirm it or decide otherwise – whilst respecting a three month deadline. 
The Council takes decisions also by QMV and can have a different decision, but 
cannot reject the measure. 
 
2.3. Regulatory procedure (Art. 5): 
This procedure is used for measures relating to the protection of the health or safety 
of persons, animals and plants and for measures amending non‐essential provisions 
of the basic legislative instruments. Member State representatives are to express 
their opinion on the draft measures submitted by the Commission through a formal 
vote. In case of a positive opinion, the Commission can adopt the measure. Where 
the response is negative, or in case of absence of an opinion, the measure is to be 
referred back to the Council which can react within a three months timeframe. 
Hence, the Commission may only adopt implementing measures if it obtains the 
approval of a qualified majority (QMV) of Member States as represented in the 
committee. 
 
2.4. Regulatory procedure with scrutiny (Art. 5a)2: 
This procedure is used when the implementing measures amend “non‐essential” 
elements of primary legislation, e.g. an annex. It is applicable under two further 
requirements: First, the basic act needs to be adopted by codecision. Second, the 
                                                        
2 Part 4 of this article gives a more in-depth analysis of this procedure. 
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mesure needs to be of general scope and considered as ‘quasi‐legislative’. Policy 
areas affected include environment, financial services, public health, and law 
enforcement cooperation. It is the most constraining procedure for the Commission. 
The European Parliament and the Council both have vetoes on Commission 
proposals, in case the committee’s opinion is positive. In the case of a negative 
opinion, the Commission will refer to the Council and forward the proposed 
measure to the EP. The Council then will have 2 months to oppose the proposed 
measure, envisage adopting the measure or have no opinion. In the latter two cases, 
the Commission will submit the measure to the EP. The EP will then have four 
months, from the initial forwarding of the proposal, to either oppose or accept the 
draft measure. All in all, this procedure is lengthened considerably to allow for 
parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
2.5. Safeguard procedure (Art. 6): 
The safeguard procedure is used very seldom. Sometimes an urgent decision 
(“safeguard measure”) is required. For example, safeguard measures were taken by 
the EU to block the export of British beef to the rest of the EU at the start of the 2007 
foot and mouth disease outbreak. In such cases the Commission notifies the Council 
and the Member States of an urgent decision that it has taken without the explicit 
approval of the comitology committee. Any Member State, however, can refer the 
Commission’s decision to the Council, which can then take a different decision or 
confirm, amend or revoke the Commission’s decision by QMV. 
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3. Comitology in Practice 
The comitology committees can be classified according to the type of procedure 
under which they operate (advisory, management, regulatory and safeguard 
procedure). The figures for 2006 indicate that about 33% of the committees (91 out 
of 277) work exclusively under the regulatory procedure, followed by a smaller 
number of committees working exclusively under the management procedure (78). 
The breakdown by policy sector shows that use of the three types of procedure 
varies from policy sector to policy sector. However, in some of the policy sectors, a 
clear dominance of one of the procedures can be noted: the Energy and Transport, 
Environment and Enterprise and Industry sectors, for instance, work with a large 
number of committees under the regulatory procedure, whereas Agriculture works 
with a large number of committees under the management procedure. 
 
Table 1. Number of committees by procedure (2006) 
 Type of procedure Committees 
operating 
under 
several 
procedures 
 Advisory Management Regulatory Safeguard  
ENTR 6 6 15 0 7 
EMPL 1 0 2 0 5 
AGRI 0 22 4 0 4 
TREN 5 2 16 0 13 
ENV 0 4 25 0 6 
RTD 0 2 0 0 1 
INFSO 0 5 2 0 6 
FISH 0 1 0 0 3 
MARKT 1 2 10 0 0 
REGIO 0 1 0 0 2 
TAXUD 1 3 5 0 1 
EAC 1 0 0 0 11 
SANCO 2 8 0 0 6 
JLS 4 1 4 0 6 
RELEX 1 2 0 0 1 
TRADE 3 3 3 1 2 
ELARG 0 3 0 1 0 
AIDCO 0 11 0 0 4 
ECHO 0 0 0 0 1 
ESTAT 0 3 3 0 2 
BUDG 1 0 1 0 0 
OLAF 0 0 1 0 0 
Total 26 79 91 2 81 
Source: European Commission (2007) 
 
But the number of committees is not the only indicator of activity at comitology 
level. The number of meetings held in 2006 reflects the intensity of work in general, 
at sector level and in individual committees. As in 2006, Agriculture leads the field 
with 327 meetings, since managing the different agricultural markets requires 
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frequent meetings. Agriculture is followed by Health and Consumer Protection with 
119 meetings and Taxation and Customs Union with 85 meetings.  
 
Table 2. Number of meetings (2005, 2006) 
 2005 2006  2005 2006 
ENTR 48 41 EAC 12 17 
EMPL 9 10 SANCO 114 119 
AGRI 308 327 JLS 31 24 
TREN 61 62 RELEX 2 4 
ENV 59 67 TRADE 26 15 
RTD 45 38 ELARG 10 11 
INFSO 31 33 AIDCO 23 26 
FISH 19 22 ECHO 10 7 
MARKT 24 36 ESTAT 16 16 
REGIO 8 10 BUDG 5 5 
TAXUD 94 85 OLAF 3 2 
Source: European Commission (2007) 
 
Last but not least the numbers of implementing measures adopted by comitology in 
2006 differ significantly. Whereas the field of agriculture represents more than 55% 
of the toal number of implementing measures (1576 out of 2862), the continuum 
ranges from important 12% in the field of Health and Consumer Protection 
represent (328) to 0,3% in the Internal Market sector (8). Based on the 
abovementioned numbers of meetings figure 3 displays the number of 
implementing measures delivered by the committees in 2007. 
 
Figure 3. Number of implementing measures (2007) 
 Implementing 
measures 
 Implementing 
measures 
ENTR 269 SANCO 331 
EMPL 14 JLS 23 
AGRI 963 RELEX 4 
TREN 39 TRADE 8 
ENV 62 ELARG 83 
RTD 57 AIDCO 388 
INFSO 36 ECHO 37 
MARE 29 ESTAT 18 
MARKT 8 BUDG 3 
REGIO 13 OLAF 0 
TAXUD 63 DIGIT 1 
EAC 73   
Source: European Commission (2008) 
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4. 2006 Reform of the Comitology System  
Comitology reform of 2006, creating a new regulatory procedure with scrutiny 
(RPS) was an important step in the direction of reinforcing legitimacy of the 
comitology system. Giving the European Parliament a possibility to exercise 
democratic control in case of adoption of implementing acts with a quasi‐legislative 
nature, it brought about a temporary cease‐fire on the comitology battle field 
between the three main institutions3. 
 
4.1 Background of the reform 
Being deeply rooted in the general discontent on part of the EP with the comitology 
system (which had been alleviated until 2006 only by very limited steps in 
increasing the EP involvement), it got its most direct impulse from the negative 
referendum results in France and in the Netherlands in the course of ratification of 
the Constitution for Europe in 2005. The latter would have increased the powers of 
the EP significantly with regard to comitology, and with regard to financial services 
in particular, putting it on an equal footing with the Council and giving it a general 
call‐back right with regard to delegated acts adopted by the Commission4. As the 
reflection period over the Constitution started in 2005, following demands of the EP, 
a Commission proposal for comitology reform from 20025 was taken out of the 
closet.  
 
The three institutions entered with fairly different views and ambitions into the 
negotiations. The EP was inclined to see it as a possibility of sliding in provisions of 
the Constitution by the back door, or at least getting a result as close to these as 
possible. The Council was naturally playing a more conservative role, being 
interested in keeping the system as close to the existing procedures, which were 
working considerably well. The Commission, on the other hand, had an interest in 
going for a deeper reform of the comitology procedures. This made it stand at least 
initially by its 2002 proposal, which among other elements included replacing the 
management procedure by advisory procedure in cases of implementation of basic 
acts adopted in co‐decision. In order to avoid getting entangled in long 
interinstitutional debates, the EP decided to hurry up the reform, referring to a 
possibility of not renewing the Commission implementing powers for basic acts in 
which a sunset clause had been inserted6 as well as freezing the funds for 
comitology committees in 2006. 
                                                        
3 Even in spite of the cease-fire, tensions keep boiling and have been manifest also in the implementation of 
the 2006 decision. 
4 Both article I-36 (delegated acts) and I-37 (implementation acts) of the Constitution were, almost 
unchanged,  incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty, ratification and entry into force of which is during the 
writing of this paper under a strong question mark after the negative results of the Irish referendum (the 
only, yet important difference being addition of condition of general scope to measures falling unde the 
category of delegated acts). 
5COM(2002) 719, 11.12.02, 2002/0298(CNS), 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/docs/comm_commito_en.pdf 
6 This concerned mostly financial sector instruments that had been adopted since 2002, many of the sunset 
clauses inserted in them being due in 2007. 
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In the end, the compromise reached under this pressure should not be 
underestimated. After discussions under the British and Austrian presidencies in 
2005 and 2006, a satisfactory balance was reached between the interests of the 
three main stakeholders. The EP could be satisfied with getting a role as equal to 
that of the Council as possible under the existing Treaty7, even if the result did not 
correspond exactly to article I‐36 of the Constitution. The Council was content that 
the reform left untouched the three existing comitology procedures and was 
confined to increasing EP control over quasi‐legislative acts. All the more, in a way, 
the creation of the new form of regulatory procedure also went in the direction of 
the long‐term intentions of the Commission, which had long sought a de‐coupling of 
quasi‐legislative measures from the pure implementation measures, with the overall 
hope that, whilst allowing for a stronger control by the legislator over the quasi‐
legislative acts, the Commission could in the end gain more decision power for 
adoption of pure implementation measures8. 
 
4.2 Definition of measures to which the new procedure is to be applied  
The definition of measures falling under RPS, binding, yet leaving however 
considerable room for interpretation, is largely inspired by article I‐36 of the 
Constitution on delegated acts. It is inserted in article 2(2) of the comitology 
decision (underlining by the author of the present article): 
 
Where a basic instrument, adopted in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty, provides for the adoption of 
measures of general scope designed to amend non-essential elements of 
that instrument, inter alia by deleting some of those elements or by 
supplementing the instrument by the addition of new non-essential 
elements, those measures shall be adopted in accordance with the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny. 
 
This definition is composed of three main conditions. The conditions are cumulative, 
meaning that they all have to be met for the RPS to be applicable in a concrete case.  
 
 
4.2.1 Scope of RPS is limited to basic acts to which co-decision applies 
 
First of these, and the least controversial, is that the basic act has to be adopted in co-
decision (in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 251 of the Treaty). 
Measures adopted under other procedures, where the Parliament is not acting as a 
co‐legislator with the Council, do not give grounds for parliamentary control in the 
                                                        
7 In the current treaty framework, article 202 gives an executive role only to the Council (the Council 
having double roles – executive and legislative), whereas the European Parliament is only given a 
legislative role and can thus only purely legislator control in the implementation phase (e.g. it could not 
adopt implementing measures itself as the Council can in certain circumstances). 
8 See also M.Shapiro „Comitologie: rétrospective et prospective apres la réforme de 2006”, RDUE 3/2006 
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implementation phase. In principle, a formalistic approach could have been taken 
that only basic acts indeed adopted by Council and EP as co‐legislators fall under 
this category. This condition has nevertheless been interpreted more widely in the 
course of alignment of existing acquis to the new comitology decision. It has thus 
been deemed to be met also for basic acts that have been adopted only by the 
Council (for example as a Council decision after consultation with the European 
Parliament), when this was the applicable procedure at the time of adoption of the 
basic act, on the condition that at the time of alignment it is co‐decision that applies 
in the relevant area (if the same basic act would be adopted or modified today then 
co‐decision would apply). 
 
 
4.2.2 Only measures of general scope can be subject to RPS 
 
Secondly, measures to be adopted have to be of a general scope. It is this 
“applicability to objectively determined situations” together with “entailment of 
immediate legal consequences in all Member States for categories of persons viewed 
in a general and abstract manner”9 that makes them quasi‐legislative.  
 
This excludes individual measures which, even if they can sometimes be politically 
controversial like decisions authorising marketing of certain GMOs have proven, are 
still only aimed at regulating individual cases and do not directly affect the general 
public. Thus they are not of a quasi‐legislative nature and do not need the same kind 
of attention by the legislator as acts of general scope.  
 
It follows naturally that when the Commission is adopting criteria according to 
which later implementation decision would be taken (for example, on the basis of 
which either the Commission itself or the relevant authorities of Member States 
could take individual decisions), then adoption of these criteria should be under 
RPS. However, adoption of individual decisions according to these criteria (same as 
in case of criteria set forth by the legislator in the basic act), would be a pure 
implementation measure. 
 
 
       4.2.3  Requirement of formal amendment of certain (non-essential) elements of the 
basic act 
 
Thirdly, these measures have to be designed to amend non‐essential elements of the 
basic instrument in question, inter alia by deleting some of those elements or by 
supplementing the instrument by the addition of new non‐essential elements. For 
instance, this can involve modification of non‐essential elements of the basic act 
itself or one of its annexes. It ought to be pointed out that, as the criteria for 
                                                        
9 ECJ judgement in joined cases 16/62 and 17/62 Confédération nationale des producteurs de fruits et 
légumes and Others vs Council (1962, ECR 471), see also case C-309/89 Codorniu (1989, ECR I-1853, 
para 18). 
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application of RPS are cumulative, in case of this kind of formal amendment also 
meeting the general scope criterion would have to be assessed. For instance, formal 
modification of an annex, which is mainly of an informative value (for instance, 
containing a list of implementation measures taken by the Member States or a list of 
individual measures taken by the Commission itself) and does not entail “immediate 
legal consequences in all Member States for categories of persons viewed in a 
general and abstract manner”, would not satisfy the RPS criteria.  
 
In order to assess whether a measure would supplement the basic act, the effect on 
the legislative framework created by the basic act should be kept in mind: if the 
measure were developing this legislative setting further, leaving a margin of 
appreciation to the Commission, it would constitute a quasi‐legislative measure and 
RPS should be applied. As an example, in its Report on the working of committees 
during 2006, the Commission has stated that in the financial services area, the 
measures adding details to the information to be contained in prospectuses would 
qualify as supplementing the co‐decision basic act by creating a new set of rules10. 
. 
On the other hand, if the Commission acts only within the legislative framework and 
according to the conditions and criteria set forth by the legislator, this would not 
constitute supplementing the basic act. 
 
 
As foreseen, only non-essential elements of the basic act can be subject to being thus 
amended. With regard to the current alignment process, it might be questioned 
whether this could be brought out as a separate criterion of the definition of quasi‐
legislative measures. However, the only legally sound option would be to part from 
the assumption that all essential elements have already been addressed in the basic 
act itself, as also foreseen in recital 7(a) of the Comitology decision11, and not been 
left to the executive branch12. It is in fact an obligation for the legislator to weigh in 
each case, which elements are essential and would thus have to be regulated in the 
basic act itself, and which can be left to be defined or established by the Commission 
as non‐essential elements. So there is no need to make this assessment when 
making the choice between different comitology procedures during the alignment 
process. 
 
 
4.3 Applying the new procedure in practice 
As for the direct practical impact of the 2006 reform13, at the present stage it would 
be too early to evaluate this both in terms of procedural effectiveness as from the 
                                                        
10 Report from the Commission on the working of committees during 2006, Brussels, 20.12.2007, 
COM(2007) 842 final. 
11 Recital 7(a) of the comitology decision reminds us that „The essential elements of a legislative act 
may only be amended by the legislator on the basis of the Treaty”. 
12 This principle has been stated in the judgements of the European Court of Justice in cases 25/70 Köster 
(1970, ECR 1161, see para 6) and C-240/90 Germany vs Commission (1992 ECR I-5423, see para 37). 
13 For an overview of the new procedure, see the chart in annex. 
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point of view of the extent of substantial contribution of the Parliament. It remains 
to be seen how actively the latter would make use of its powers under RPS: whether 
it will be analysing in detail all the draft measures falling under RPS14 or concentrate 
on the measures in sensitive areas like issues affecting public health and 
environment norms15, as well as the financial services sector, for which it has 
previously shown most interest. Some practical aspects of the RPS can still be 
considered over the next few pages whilst waiting for the statistical and substantial 
data, which would allow drawing broader conclusions on the application of the 
2006 reform. 
 
 
4.3.1 Which acts fall under RPS after the 2006 reform?  
 
Each basic act has to foresee explicitly under which comitology procedure, if any16, 
measures for its implementation are to be taken. This means that in order to make 
RPS applicable for taking implementation measures under a specific basic act, a 
reference to this new procedure would have to be incorporated into this basic act 
first. For legal acts adopted after the entry into force of the 2006 comitology 
decision, there is without a question a legal obligation to refer to the RPS, provided 
that its criteria are met. Practice has already shown that this increases the 
importance of debates on the choice of committee procedure, which can continue 
until the conciliation phase of the legislative process, as shown for instance in case 
of the civil aviation security regulation17.  
 
As for the acquis in force, 2006 reform did not have any direct legal consequences18. 
However, it did not seem satisfactory to the European Parliament to have its newly 
won prerogatives only in force for acts adopted after the 2006 reform. Thus, as a 
corollary to the 2006 reform, a list of 26 basic acts was agreed upon, in relation to 
which the Commission engaged itself to present proposals for their alignment to the 
amended comitology decision19. This “priority alignment” concerned mostly acts in 
which the European Parliament took most interest – mainly Lamfalussy acts from 
the financial services sector, and other acts into which a sunset clause had been 
                                                        
14 It brings us also to an interesting question of technical and scientific expertise, to which the EP, 
unlike Member States, does not have direct access to. Increasing parliamentary control could thus 
eventually turn into opening up new perspectives for interested lobby‐groups. 
15 This has also been shown by the practice under article 8 of the Comitology decision, giving it a right of 
presenting reasoned resolutions to which EP has rarely had recourse. Some examples: EP resolution of 
28.10.04 concerning TSEs (transmissible spongiform encephalopathies) and animal nutrition; EP 
resolutions of 12.04.05. and 06.07.05 concerning restriction of use of certain hazardous substance in 
electrical and electronic equipment.  
16 In specific and substantiated cases the Council may reserve the right to exercise implementing powers 
itself, as also specified in article 1 of the Comitology decision. 
17 Regulation 300/2008 of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of aviation security.  
18 European Parliament, the Council and the Commission statement (published in the OJ C 255/1 21.10.06) 
para 4 states that for the new procedure to be applicable to instruments adopted by codecision which are 
already in force, those instruments must be adjusted in accordance with the applicable procedures. 
19 Commission proposal COM(2006) 900. 
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inserted (several were from the field of environment, another subject of increasing 
interest of the EP). There was a general understanding, at least on the side of the 
Member States, that alignment would be limited to this list and that for the rest of 
the acquis such an exercise would not be undertaken.  
 
Even before this priority alignment was completed towards the end of 2007, it 
become however clear that the alignment would go further. Developments in the 
comitology system have always been an indicator of changes in the institutional 
balance on a greater scale. In the present case, the Parliament, steadily advancing on 
the road to increasing powers and improved skills in the institutional power game, 
was successful in getting the Commission to commit itself to carrying out a full 
screening of the existing acquis and to presenting proposals for a general 
alignment20. Due to the amount of acts concerned, this was done in four alignment 
regulations, called “omnibus proposals”21.  
 
The omnibus method was chosen by the Commission no doubt in order to facilitate 
their handling. But this also helps keeping the examination strictly in the framework 
of the alignment exercise and avoiding temptations of opening the text of basic 
instruments in any other respect than adding a reference to RPS. This was the line 
also adopted by the two other institutions, otherwise the exercise would have 
become completely unwieldy. Three of the omnibuses contain alignment proposals 
for basic acts from various fields – from agriculture and environment to internal 
market and humanitarian aid. Only the basic acts in the JHA field have been dealt 
with separately, in the III omnibus, because of different procedures applicable in 
this area.  
 
In order to ensure quick handling of the omnibus proposals, on the side of the 
European Parliament, the JURI committee is invested with this task. On the side of 
the Council, in January 2008 a mandate was agreed for the Friends of Presidency 
group, whose task it is to ensure horizontal co‐ordination, consulting with the 
relevant Council working parties. This made it possible to conclude substantial work 
on the omnibuses by the end of 2008. Discussion on I and III omnibuses was 
                                                        
20 A general alignment was also conducted after the 1999 reform: at the end of 2001 the Commission 
presented a package of four proposals (“alignment regulations” COM(2001) 789), covering more than 300 
basic instruments. The “alignment regulations” were adopted in the course of 2003. 
21 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council adapting a number of 
instruments subject to the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty to Council Decision 
1999/468/EC, as amended by Decision 2006/512/EC, with regard to the regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny (part I: COM (2007) 741 covering 59 basic instruments; part II: COM (2007) 824 covering 47 
basic instruments; part III: COM (2007) 822 covering 4 basic instruments; and part IV: COM 
(2008)71 covering 42 basic instruments). It is worth noting that the Parliament has called for a „fifth 
omnibus”, making propositions for acts to be included. For more information on the Parliament’s 
request for this „fifth omnibus”, see report of 15.09.08 by MEP József Szájer A6‐0345/2008, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=‐//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6‐2008‐
0345+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN It is now the task of the Commission to make their evaluation and to 
decide whether it will be necessary to present an additional alignment proposal. 
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completed under the Slovenian presidency (adoption in the first reading in 
September 2008). As for the II and IV omnibuses, which included more 
controversial cases, an agreement has been reached during the French presidency.  
 
 
4.3.2 Application of RPS criteria in practice: finding the way in the “grey zones”  
 
Application of the RPS criteria to a concrete case can seem relatively easy. For 
example, in cases where the Commission is given powers to set criteria or 
guidelines, which are binding for all Member States when they in their turn adopt 
concrete implementation measures on ground, and which constitute additions to 
the legal framework created by the basic act. In these cases there is a clear and 
manifest need for control by the legislator over such quasi‐legislative measures. The 
same would not, however, apply to non‐binding guidelines, the only purpose of 
which is to serve as a reference for the Member States for taking their 
implementation measures. Such guidelines would not satisfy the criteria as they 
would not supplement the legal framework of the basic act and neither do they 
correspond to the ECJ definition of measures of general scope.  
 
Among more difficult cases, from omnibus I the example of Directive 2005/36 on 
the recognition of professional qualifications can be referred to. This basic act 
contains article 61 conferring power to the Commission to grant derogations to a 
concrete Member State. Here the Parliament considered that RPS should apply, 
„taking into account that a general derogation for any Member State will constitute a 
measure of general scope (because of its effects on any interested party from any 
other Member State)”22. After  interinstitutional discussions it was still concluded 
that ordinary regulatory procedure should apply in such cases as this concerns a 
measure addressing only one Member State without „entailment of immediate legal 
consequences in all Member States”, even though the European Parliament did not 
wish to accept this argument and let itself only be convinced by an additional 
argument that another criteria was not matched, namely as “the derogations in 
question would implement (and not amend) the basic act”. 
 
Omnibus III gives a good selection of fairly clear‐cut cases to which RPS applies. For 
instance, making substantial amendments to annexes23, e.g. updating or technical 
                                                        
22 See also the Report of the Legal Affairs committee of the European Parliament with recommendations to 
the Commission on the alignment of legal acts to the new Comitology Decision (2008/2096(INI)), A6-
0345/2008, 15.09.2008, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A6-2008-
0345&language=EN#title2 
23 It should be noted that whereas most of the cases of annex amendment fulfil the criteria of RPS (for 
example, updating in order to take account of technical and scientific developments), this should still 
not be regarded as an automatic rule as also in such a case it has to be verified whether all criteria 
are met. For example, purely technical amendments to lists of measures in annexes could not be 
regarded as fulfilling RPS criteria. 
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adjustments of the forms, specimens of which appear in Annexes to the basic act24 
as well as modifying standard forms in annexes25. Other cases include for example 
adoption of additional rules for implementation of transfers26 or adopting of a 
conciliation mechanism27, which give a considerable margin of appreciation to the 
Commission.  
 
Concerning application of criteria for the RPS, there exists so far no case‐law of the 
European Court of Justice, so the legislators have to find their way through the grey 
zones without its guidance. Some general guidelines established by the ECJ in its 
comitology case‐law before the 2006 reform are of little help in this regard. For 
example, in the LIFE and Forest Focus cases28 the Court emphasized the non‐
binding nature of the three “traditional” comitology procedures, though reminding 
the institutions about the obligation to give reasons for the choice of the procedure 
in light of the indications given in article 2 of the Comitology decision. In the 
Common Market Fertilizers case29 the Court reminded of another possibility: in case 
no explicit mention of use of a specific comitology procedure is made in the enabling 
article, the Commission can adopt measures without following comitology rules (for 
instance, it can convene ‘a group of experts’, which in practice may consist of same 
experts who are representatives in the comitology committees, without being bound 
by their opinion). This freedom of choice for the legislators, which applies to the 
three traditional comitology procedures (advisory, management and regulatory), 
could not however be exercised for the RPS due to its binding nature.  
 
 
4.3.3 Timeframes: important aspect of practical consequences of recourse to the RPS 
 
The importance of the creation of RPS as a form of extensive ex ante control by the 
legislator can certainly not be underestimated, as this is a great step towards 
legitimation of adoption of quasi‐legislative measures by the executive on the EU 
level. Still there is one difficult issue to be settled in practice: the question of having 
recourse to shortened deadlines and to the urgency mechanism. As the procedure 
becomes longer and heavier, it will take goodwill from the part of the legislator to 
guarantee that the effectiveness of the comitology system will not be hampered 
down as a consequence of this important step and that the procedure for adoption 
of quasi‐legislative measures would not start resembling the ordinary legislative 
procedure in practice.  
 
                                                        
24 Article 74(2) of Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22.12.2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters. 
25 Article 31 of Regulation 805/2004 of the EP and Council of 21.04.2004 creating a European 
Enforcement Order for uncontested claims. 
26 Ibid, article 19(5). 
27 Article 15(5) of Regulation 343/2003. 
28 C-378/00 “LIFE” (21.01.03) and case 122/04 Commission v European Parliament and the Council 
(Forest Focus). 
29 Case C‐443/05 P Common Market Fertilizers SA v Commission 
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In the comitology decision the default deadlines for legislators to examine the draft 
measure falling under RPS have been set to three months in case of a positive 
opinion by the committee and to two plus two months in case of a negative or no 
opinion of the committee (these months are added to the time of consideration of 
the draft in the comitology committee). Because of its different working methods, 
especially its habit of deliberating in the timeframe of legislative procedure, already 
these standard deadlines foreseen for RPS are hard to manage for the European 
Parliament. In practice these deadlines are likely to become even longer, as the 
Commission and the EP have agreed that the former would, when transmitting draft 
implementation measures to the EP, take into account the latter’s periods of recess ‐ 
winter and summer holidays as well as European elections30.  
 
In order to ensure full effectiveness of the measures, or for the grounds of public 
safety, in addition to standard deadlines, also possibilities to shorten the deadlines 
or to have recourse to the urgency procedure are foreseen31. Because of the reasons 
described above, the EP has reason to be reluctant to give effect to these 
possibilities – seeking deletion of provisions on curtailed timelimits or the urgency 
procedure is highly on the agenda also in EP reports on the omnibus proposals32. 
Certainly, the need for recourse to these elements of flexibility in implementation of 
the RPS has to be carefully weighed case by case. The limits posed by the internal 
procedures of the Parliament should still not become a determining factor in 
deciding upon necessity of shortened time limits. In case the Parliament would 
make necessary adjustments to its internal procedures, this would help to ensure a 
truly balanced outcome, establishment of the RPS having increased legitimacy and 
democratic control in the implementation phase33 without reducing the level of 
effectiveness beyond reasonable limit.  
                                                        
30 Agreement between the European Parliament and the Commission on procedures for implementing 
Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission, as amended by Decision 2006/512/EC (OJ C 143/1 10.06.08). It should be 
noted that this however does not apply in cases where shorter timelines or urgency procedure has been 
foreseen in the basic act. 
31 According to article 5a(5)(b) of the comitology decision, time‐limits can be either curtailed on the 
grounds of efficiency, or extended by an additional month, when justified by the complexity of the 
measures. Article 5a(6) of the Comitology decision envisages an urgency procedure, with a 
possibility for the Commission to take measures, which shall immediately be implemented, right 
after the delivering of a positive opinion of the committee. The Council and Parliament can exercise 
an ex post control in these cases. In event of their opposition, the measure shall be repealed, with a 
possibility of maintaining it provisionally if warranted on health protection, safety or environmental 
grounds. 
32 For example, EP report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
adapting a number of instruments subject to the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty to 
Council Decision 1999/468/EC, as amended by Decision 2006/512/EC, with regard to the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny – Adaptation to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny – Part Four. 08.07.2008. 
A6-0301/2008. 
33 The European Parliament has sought itself a role in the implementation phase, for which there is little 
comparison in national decision-making systems. See also Hix, S (2000) „Parliamentary oversight of 
executive power: what role for the European Parliament in comitology” and Neuhold, Christine „Taming 
the „Trojan Horse” of Comitology?”, European Integration online papers, underline the uniqueness of the 
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new prerogatives of the legislator on the EU level, whereas M. Shapiro refers to the United Kingdom as a 
rare case in which powers of the legislator are even broader. 
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5. Conclusion: The Future of the Comitology System 
At its heart, comitology is a compromise between administrative efficiency and 
democratic accountability (Christiansen and Vaccari, 2006). The precise point 
where the balance is to be found is necessarily a political decision and has shifted 
over time. The comitology process has been opened gradually as the EU has come 
under increasing pressure to improve transparency and accountability (Türk, 2003; 
). 
 
The new regulatory procedure with scrutiny reflects the inherent tension between 
efficiency and accountability and has moved comitology towards the latter 
(Schusterschitz and Kotz, 2007). Directly elected politicians will now be able to veto 
many politically sensitive decisions. The price paid for this greater accountability is 
the greatly increased time the new procedure will take to produce rules. 
 
Whilst waiting for the additional elements for an evaluation of the 2006 reform, the 
eyes of the stakeholders are already also on the future of the comitology system. 
Even though there is still no clarity on the possible entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, there are grounds for analysing the possible implications of its provisions on 
comitology, which are linked with broader visions of the main stakeholders in the 
comitology system. 
 
In its very core, comitology is an embodiment of an endless balancing between the 
intergouvernmental and supranational methods of decision‐making, trying to 
reconcile different visions and considerations. It reflects the system of plurality of 
stakeholders, with an important role given to the Commission as the supranational 
executive, whilst however respecting the need to guarantee flexible implementation 
by taking into account the specificities of Member States, who implement the 
common rules “on the ground”. Continuous evolving of the comitology system is a 
mirror of more general developments in the EU decision‐making system. This is also 
true of the deepening democratization process increasing the role of the European 
Parliament (Bradley, 1997), which manifests itself also in the changes to the 
comitology system foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Sketching in a few lines the changes in the Lisbon Treaty, as the first element it 
should be underlined that it makes a distinction on primary law level between 
purely implementing measures and quasi‐legislative acts, which it calls “delegated 
acts”. For the delegated acts, the definition of which resembles to a large extent to 
that of the RPS measures, important procedural changes are foreseen in the Treaty 
of Lisbon34. Among them is a right of either of the legislators to revoke delegation of 
implementation powers to the Commission, i.e. the “call‐back right”35. This would 
                                                        
34 According to the new numerotation, the new article on delegated acts is numbered 290. See the codified 
version of the treaties, with the Treaty of Lisbon incorporated, OJ C 115, 09.05.2008, p 47 – 199,  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF. 
35 Article 290 firstly outlines the definition of acts falling under its scope: a legislative act may delegate 
to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend 
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need to gather majority of component members of the Parliament or qualified 
majority in the Council. For the Council this would mean weaker possibilities for 
blocking, because instead of blocking minority rule foreseen in the RPS, there would 
be a need to gather qualified majority against the act, which would make the 
procedure more similar to the current management procedure from the point of 
view of the Council. Although the adoption of a horizontal legal framework is not 
mentioned in the new Treaty, for reasons of clarity and legal security it would seem 
reasonable for the institutions to agree upon horizontal rules, so that they would not 
have to be negotiated separately for each basic act.  
 
The Parliament has called for a new general alignment of the acquis to this new 
procedure for delegated acts36. However, by the time the Lisbon Treaty can enter in 
force, the existing acquis would already be aligned to RPS, which in substance gives 
the EP rights comparable to those it would have under the Lisbon Treaty provisions. 
Bearing this in mind, it would not be reasonable to proceed to a new time‐
consuming general alignment exercise, but rather align the existing acts on a case by 
case basis in course of the revision of the legal acts.  
 
For the implementing acts the situation is clearer as the Lisbon Treaty foresees that the 
legislators would have to lay down in advance the rules and general principles concerning 
mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing 
powers37. In principle, this has already been done by the current comitology decision, 
which will remain in force also after the entry into force of the new Treaty (except for the 
part concerning RPS). Even in case the Commission would present a proposal for a new 
regulation to be adopted by the co-legislators (the present comitology decision is adopted 
by the Council by unanimity), the system could remain almost the same as under the 
current comitology decision. One of the issues to be addressed in this case would be 
procedural implications of the explicit reference to Member States instead of Council as 
the authority exercising the control.  
 
For the Council and Member States it would clearly be natural to favour a system as 
similar to the present one as possible. They have a legitimate interest to defend: 
keeping it is the Member States who ensure application of Community Law on the 
ground, so their possibility to influence the process and to be able to refuse drafts 
that pose a problem for a large number of Member States, is absolutely vital. The 
Parliament would most likely use all the means it disposes in order to maximize the 
increase of its powers under the new Treaty, which will further increase 
legitimisation of the comitology system. The Commission could play a balancing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
certain non-essential elements of the legislative act. Article 290(2) stipulates that legislative acts shall 
explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is subject; these conditions may be as follows: 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; (b) the delegated act 
may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the European Parliament or the 
Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
36 Report of the Legal Affairs Committee, A6-0345/2008. 
37 Article 291(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (after renumbering according to 
the Lisbon Treaty). 
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role, but would naturally be aiming at being as little restrained by outside control as 
possible when taking implementation measures or adopting delegated acts.  
 
Although it has been less outspoken about its vision than the Parliament, ithe 
Commission could be regarded as another potential winner if the Lisbon treaty were 
to enter into force. In addition to advantages that the new procedure could present 
for it, the latter is also hoping that broader legislative control for adoption of the 
delegated acts would in turn amount to wider use of delegation thus increasing its 
powers (Szapiro, 2006). 
 
In conclusion, the 2006 reform has been an important step in increasing 
accountability and legitimacy of the comitology system. It does not however 
constitute a final set in the power game, which would be bound to continue soon, 
should the Lisbon Treaty enter into force. Ambitions of the institutions are 
intertwined here with considerations of efficiency, accountability and legal security 
and every step on this road needs to be carefully balanced, taking into account the 
important impact it is having on the supranational rule‐making, which affects daily 
life of the citizens and entities of the Union.  
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* Timeframe can be modified in the basic act: extended by 1 month or curtailed (no specific limit). 
There is also a possibility for urgency procedure (art 5a(6)). 
** A justification needs to be given: exceeding implementing powers, incompatibility with aim  
and content of basic act or not respecting principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (art 5a(3)(b)). 
*** Commission may submit amended draft measure or present a legislative proposal. 
MoM – EP is acting by a majority of its component members  
COM presents a proposal 
for measure to which RPS 
is applicable to comitology 
committee
Committee (QMV) positive 
opinion   COM presents 
proposal without delay to 
Council and EP  
Committee (QMV) negative 
opinion or no opinion   
proposal submitted to 
Council and forwarded to the 
EP
No opposition  
during 3 months * 
COM adopts the 
measure 
Council opposes 
(QMV) within 2 
months *
Council positive (QMV) or 
no opinion within 2 
months*   proposal is 
submitted to the EP
Council (QMV) or EP 
(MoM) opposes** 
within 3 months * 
COM does not adopt 
the measure*** 
COM does not adopt 
the measure*** 
EP opposes (MoM)**
within 4 months of 
forwarding *
EP does not oppose 
within 4 months of 
forwarding *
Council or 
Commission adopts 
the measure
COM does not adopt 
the measure*** 
 
Glossary: 
 
Advisory procedure 
one of the five Comitology procedures and is defined in the Comitology 
Decision 2006/512/EC as default procedure (Art. 3). 
AM 
abbreviation for Absolute Majority. AM is a voting system requiring that 
more than half of all member of a group (including those members not 
present or abstaining) vote in favour for a proposal in order for it to pass. 
Comitology committees 
established by the Council and chaired by the European Commission, 
Comitology Committees consist of experts from each Member State who are 
deciding about the technical details of implementing measures. The legal 
base of Comitology Committees can be found in Art. 202 EU, where the 
Council refers the implementing power to the European Commission. In 
this sense Comitology Committees support as well as control the 
Commission by executing this implementing power. A list of all Comitology 
Committees can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/registre.cfm?CL=en 
Comitology Decision 
Decision of the Council (legislative act), based on Art.202 and adopted by 
unanimity, which provides horizontal rules and procedures for the work of 
comitology committees. 
Implementing act 
act which implement a basic (legislative) instrument, adopted by the 
Commission, assisted by comitology committees. 
Lamfalussy procedure 
special comitology procedure used in the field of financial services. 
Lisbon Treaty 
also known as “Reform Treaty”, was signed in Lisbon on 12 December 2007 
and is due to ratification in 2008. The Treaty of Lisbon is the result of the so 
called “reflection period” that set in after the Constitutional Treaty failed to 
be ratified in 2005. The full text of the Treaty of Lisbon can be retrieved 
from:  
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf 
Management procedure 
one of the five Comitology procedures financial support programmes and 
agricultural markets (Art. 4) 
´Omnibus proposals 
term referring to the screening process of the Commission of the whole 
codecision acquis: 4 ´omnibus´ proposals have been adopted. They 
including approx. 220 legislative acts that are aligned to the new 
Comitology regulatory procedure with scrutiny. 
PRAC 
French abbreviation for procédure réglementaire avec contrôle (? 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny). 
QMV  
abbreviation for Qualified‐Majority Voting.  
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´Quasi-legislative measure 
measures to which the Regulatory Procedure with scrutiny applies, as set 
down in the Comitology Decision 2006/512/EC, Art. 5a. Quasi‐legislative 
measures are all those measures that are changing the legal content of a 
basic legal act: thus, they are either amendments of regulations or directives 
(for instance, adaptation of technical annexes to scientific progress); or 
provisions that supplement the rules in the basic legal act.  
Regulatory procedure with scrutiny 
one of the five Comitology procedures which was introduced by the 
Comitology Decision 2006/512/EC. It is applicable to codecision files and 
for measures of general scope designed to amend non‐essential elements of 
the basic act, by deleting some of those element or by supplementing them 
by the addition of non essential elements (Art.5 a).  
Safeguard procedure 
also known as Urgency Procedure, is one of the five Comitology procedures 
which grants the Commission a high degree of discretionary power. Before 
adapting a foreseen measure, the Commission only communicates it to the 
Member States without systematic consultation. However, the safeguard 
procedure is rarely used and only applies in cases of urgency (Art. 6). 
Simple majority 
a voting system that requires more than 50% of all ballots cast in order for 
a proposal to pass. 
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